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Abstract
Deep neural networks are powerful and popular learning models that achieve state-of-the-art pattern
recognition performance on many computer vision, speech, and language processing tasks. However,
these networks have also been shown susceptible to carefully crafted adversarial perturbations which
force misclassification of the inputs. Adversarial examples enable adversaries to subvert the expected
system behavior leading to undesired consequences and could pose a security risk when these systems are
deployed in the real world.
In this work, we focus on deep convolutional neural networks and demonstrate that adversaries can
easily craft adversarial examples even without any internal knowledge of the target network. Our attacks
treat the network as an oracle (black-box) and only assume that the output of the network can be observed
on the probed inputs. Our first attack is based on a simple idea of adding perturbation to a randomly
selected single pixel or a small set of them. We then improve the effectiveness of this attack by carefully
constructing a small set of pixels to perturb by using the idea of greedy local-search. Our proposed
attacks also naturally extend to a stronger notion of misclassification. Our extensive experimental results
illustrate that even these elementary attacks can reveal a deep neural network’s vulnerabilities. The
simplicity and effectiveness of our proposed schemes mean that they could serve as a litmus test for
designing robust networks.
1 Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are among the most popular techniques employed for computer vision
tasks, including but not limited to image recognition, localization, video tracking, and image and video
segmentation (Goodfellow et al., 2016). Though these deep networks have exhibited good performances
for these tasks, they have recently been shown to be particularly susceptible to adversarial perturbations
to the input images (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Papernot
et al., 2016c,b; Kurakin et al., 2016; Grosse et al., 2016; Zagoruyko, 2016b). Vulnerability of these networks
to adversarial attacks can lead to undesirable consequences in many practical applications using them.
For example, adversarial attacks can be used to subvert fraud detection, malware detection, or mislead
autonomous navigation systems (Papernot et al., 2016c; Grosse et al., 2016). Further strengthening these
results is a recent observation by Kurakin et al. (2016) who showed that a significant fraction of adversarial
images crafted using the original network are misclassified even when fed to the classifier through a physical
world system (such as a camera).
In this paper, we investigate the problem of robustness of state-of-the-art convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) to simple black-box adversarial attacks. The rough goal of adversarial attacks is as follows: Given an
image I that is correctly classified by a machine learning system (say, a CNN), is it possible to construct
a transformation of I (say, by adding a small perturbation to some or all the pixels) that now leads to
misclassification by the system. Since large perturbations can trivially lead to misclassification, the attacks
seek to limit the amount of perturbation applied under some chosen metric. More often than not, in these
attacks, the modification done to the image is so subtle that the changes are imperceptible to a human eye.
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Our proposed attacks also share this property, in addition to being practical and simplistic, thus highlighting
a worrying aspect about lack of robustness prevalent in these modern vision techniques.
There are two main research directions in the literature on adversarial attacks based on different as-
sumptions about the adversarial knowledge of the target network. The first line of work assumes that the
adversary has detailed knowledge of the network architecture and the parameters resulting from training (or
access to the labeled training set) (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016;
Papernot et al., 2016c). Using this information, an adversary constructs a perturbation for a given image.
The most effective methods are gradient-based: a small perturbation is constructed based on the gradients
of the loss function w.r.t. the input image and a target label. Often, adding this small perturbation to the
original image leads to a misclassification. In the second line of work an adversary has restricted knowledge
about the network from being able to only observe the network’s output on some probed inputs (Papernot
et al., 2016b). Our work falls into this category. While this black-box model is a much more realistic and
applicable threat model, it is also more challenging because it considers weak adversaries without knowledge
of the network architecture, parameters, or training data. Interestingly, our results suggest that this level of
access and a small number of queries provide sufficient information to construct an adversarial image.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Table 1: The top row shows the original images and the bottom row shows the perturbed images. The
misclassification is as follows: (a) a stingray misclassified as a sea lion, (b) an ostrich misclassified as a goose,
(c) a jay misclassified as a junco, and (d) a water ouzel misclassified as a redshank.
As we operate in a black-box setting, we use a gradient-free approach to adversarial image generation.
Papernot et al. (2016b) were the first to discuss a black-box attack against deep learning systems. Their
attack crucially relies on the observation that there is a transferability (generalization) property in adversarial
examples, i.e., adversarial examples form one model transfers to another. Our proposed attacks on the
other hand is much more simple and direct, does not require this transferability property, and hence is more
effective in constructing adversarial images, in addition to having some other computational advantages. We
demonstrate that our method is capable of constructing adversarial images for several network architectures
trained on different datasets. In particular in this paper, we consider the CIFAR10, MNIST, SVHN, STL10,
and ImageNet1000 datasets, and two popular network architectures, Network-in-Network (Lin et al., 2014)
and VGG (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014). In Table 1, we show four images from the ImageNet1000 dataset.
The original images are in the upper row. The bottom row shows the corresponding perturbed images
produced by our algorithm which are misclassified by a VGG CNN-S network (Chatfield et al., 2014a).
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Our Contributions. In this work, we present simple and effective black-box adversarial attacks on deep
convolutional neural networks. We make the following main contributions in this paper.
(1) The first question we investigate is the influence of perturbing a single pixel on the prediction. To do so, we
devise a simple scheme, based on randomly selecting a single pixel and applying a strong perturbation to it.
Somewhat surprisingly, we noticed that a few trails of this random experiment is already quite enough in
generating adversarial images for low resolution image sets. In fact, in many cases, for misclassification, the
amount of perturbation needed to be applied to the selected pixel is also quite small. For high-resolution
images, a similar phenomena holds, except our scheme now picks a random set of around 50 pixels. These
simple experiments show the ease of generating adversarial images for modern deep CNNs without knowledge
of either the network architecture or its parameters. There is however one shortcoming in these approaches
in that the perturbed image might have pixel values that are outside some expected range.
(2) We overcome this above shortcoming by showing that lower perturbation suffices if we carefully select the
pixels for perturbation. The approach is based the idea of greedy local search, an iterative search procedure,
where in each round a local neighborhood is used to refine the current image and in process minimizing the
probability of the network assigning high confidence scores to the true class label. Again while the algorithm
is quite simple, it is rather effective in generating adversarial images with quite small perturbations. We also
show an interesting connection between the pixels chosen for perturbation by our approach and the saliency
map of an image, as defined by Simonyan et al. (2014), that ranks pixels based on their influence on the
output score. In effect our approach identifies pixels with high saliency scores but without explicitly using
any gradient information (as needed in the definition of saliency map (Simonyan et al., 2014)). Intuitively,
in each round, our local-search based approach computes an implicit approximation to the gradient of the
current image by understanding the influence of a few pixels on the output, which is then used to update
the current image.
(3) We perform extensive experimental evaluations, and show that our local-search based approach reliably
generates adversarial examples with little perturbation (even when compared to a recent elegant adversarial
attack proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2015) which needs perfect knowledge of the network). Another
feature of our attack is that, by design, our approach only perturbs a very small fraction of the pixels
during the adversarial image generation process (e.g., on the ImageNet1000 dataset we on average perturb
only about 0.5% of the pixels per image). Most previous attacks require the ability to perturb all the pixels
in the image.
(4) Our approaches naturally extend to a stronger notion of misclassification (that we refer to as k-misclassification),
where the goal is to ensure that the true label of the image does not even appear in the top-k predictions
of the network (obtained by sorting the confidence score vector). This notion especially captures the fact
that many modern systems (e.g., ImageNet competition entrants) are evaluated based on top-k predictions.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first adversarial attacks on deep neural networks achieving
k-misclassification.
2 Related work
Starting with the seminal paper by Szegedy et al. (2014), which showed that the state-of-the-art neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, there has been significant attention focused on this problem. The
research has led to investigation of different adversarial threat models and scenarios (Papernot et al., 2016c,b;
Grosse et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016; Fawzi et al., 2016), computationally efficient attacks (Goodfellow
et al., 2015), perturbation efficient attacks (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), etc.
Szegedy et al. (2014) used a box-constrained L-BFGS technique to generate adversarial examples. They
also showed a transferability (or generalization) property for adversarial examples, in that adversarial
examples generated for one network might also be misclassified by a related network with possibly different
hyper-parameters (number of layers, initial weights, etc.). However, the need for a solving a series of costly
penalized optimization problems makes this technique computationally expensive for generating adversarial
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examples. This issue was fixed by Goodfellow et al. (2015) who motivated by the underlying linearity of the
components used to build a network proposed an elegant scheme based on adding perturbation proportional
to sign of the network’s cost function gradient. Recently, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) used an iterative
linearization procedure to generate adversarial examples with lesser perturbation. Another recent attack
proposed by Papernot et al. (2016c) uses a notion of adversarial saliency maps (based on the saliency maps
introduced by (Simonyan et al., 2014)) to select the most sensitive input components for perturbation. This
attack has been adapted by Grosse et al. (2016) for generating adversarial samples for neural networks used
as malware classifiers. However, all these above described attacks require perfect knowledge of the target
network’s architecture and parameters which limits their applicability to strong adversaries with the capability
of gaining insider knowledge of the target system.
Our focus in this paper is the setting of black-box attacks, where we assume that an adversary has only
the ability to use the network as an oracle. The adversary can obtain output from supplied inputs, and use
the observed input-output relationship to craft adversarial images.1 In the context of deep neural networks, a
black-box attack was first proposed by Papernot et al. (2016b) with the motivation of constructing an attack
on a remotely hosted system.2 Their general idea is to first approximate the target network by querying
it for output labels, which is used to train a substitute network, which is then used to craft adversarial
examples for the original network. The success of the attack crucially depends on the transferability property
to hold between the original and the substitute network. Our black-box attack is more direct, and completely
avoids the transferability assumption, making it far more applicable. We also avoid the overhead of gathering
data and training a substitute network. Additionally, our techniques can be adapted to a stronger notion of
misclassification.
A complementary line of work has focused on building defenses against adversarial attacks. Although
designing defenses is beyond scope of this paper, it is possible that adapting the previous suggested defense
solutions such as Jacobian-based regularization (Gu and Rigazio, 2015) and distillation (Papernot et al., 2016d)
can reduce the efficacy of our proposed attacks. Moreover, the recently proposed technique of differentially
private training (Abadi et al., 2016) can also prove beneficial here.
The study of adversarial instability have led to development of solutions that seeks to improve training
to in return increase the robustness and classification performance of the network. In some case, adding
adversarial examples to the training (adversarial training) set can act like a regularizer (Szegedy et al.,
2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). The phenomenon of adversarial instability has
also been theoretically investigated for certain families of classifiers under various models of (semi) random
noise (Fawzi et al., 2015, 2016). However, as we discuss later, due to peculiar nature of adversarial images
generated by our approaches, a simple adversarial training is only mildly effective in preventing future similar
adversarial attacks.
The security of machine learning in settings distinct from deep neural networks is also an area of active
research with various known attacks under different threat models. We refer the reader to a recent survey
by McDaniel et al. (2016) and references therein.
3 Preliminaries
Notation and Normalization. We denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. The dataset of images is partitioned
into train and test (or validation) subsets. An element of a dataset is a pair (I, c(I)) for an image I and a
ground truth label c(I) of this image. We assume that the class labels are drawn from the set {1, . . . , C},
i.e., we have a set of C ∈ N possible labels. We assume that images have ` channels (in experiments we
use the RGB format) and are of width w ∈ N and height h ∈ N. We say that (b, x, y) is a coordinate of an
image for channel b and location (x, y), and (?, x, y) is a pixel of an image where (?, x, y) represents all the
1These kind of attacks are also known as differential attacksmotivated by the use of the term in differential cryptanalysis (Biham
and Shamir, 1991).
2Papernot et al. (2016a) have recently extended this attack beyond deep neural networks to other classes of machine learning
techniques.
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` coordinates corresponding to different channels at location (x, y). I(b, x, y) ∈ R is the value of I at the
(b, x, y) coordinate, and similarly I(?, x, y) ∈ R` represents the vector of values of I at the (?, x, y) pixel.
It is a common practice to normalize the image before passing it to the network. A normalized image
has the same dimension as the original image, but differs in the coordinate values. In this work we treat
the normalization procedure as an external procedure and assume that all images are normalized. As we
always work with normalized images, in the following, a reference to image means a normalized input image.
We denote by LB and UB two constants such that all the coordinates of all the normalized images fall in
the range [LB,UB]. Generally, LB < 0 and UB > 0. We denote by I ⊂ R`×w×h the space of all (valid)
images which satisfy the following property: for every I ∈ I, for all coordinates (b, x, y) ∈ [`] × [w] × [h],
I(b, x, y) ∈ [LB,UB].
We denote by NN a trained neural network (trained on some set of training images). NN takes an image
I as an input and outputs a vector NN(I) = (o1, . . . , oC), where oj denotes the probability as determined by
NN that image I belongs to class j. We denote pi(NN(I), k) a function that returns a set of indices that are
the top-k predictions (ranked by decreasing probability scores with ties broken arbitrarily) of the network
NN. For example, if NN(I) = (0.25, 0.1, 0.2, 0.45), then pi(NN(I), 1) = {4} (corresponding to the location of
the entry 0.45). Similarly, pi(NN(I), 2) = {4, 1}, pi(NN(I), 3) = {4, 1, 3}, etc.
Adversarial Goal. Before we define the goal of black-box adversarial attacks, we define misclassification
for a NN. In this paper, we use a stronger notion of misclassification, which we refer to as k-misclassification
for k ∈ N.
Definition 1 (k-misclassification) A neural network NN k-misclassifies an image I with true label c(I)
iff the output NN(I) of the network satisfies c(I) /∈ pi(NN(I), k).
In other words, k-misclassification means that the network ranks the true label below at least k other labels.
Traditionally the literature on adversarial attacks have only considered the case where k = 1. Note that
an adversary that achieves a k-misclassification for k > 1 is a stronger adversary than one achieving an
1-misclassification (k-misclassification implies k′-misclassification for all 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k). If k = 1, we simply say
that NN misclassifies the image.
In our setting, an adversary Adv is a function that takes in image I as input and whose output is another
image Adv(I) (with same number of coordinates as I). We define an adversarial image as one that fools a
network into k-misclassification.
Definition 2 (Adversarial Image) Given access to an image I, we say that an Adv(I) is a k-adversarial
image (resp. adversarial image) if c(I) ∈ pi(NN(I), k) and c(I) /∈ pi(NN(Adv(I)), k) (resp. c(I) ∈ pi(NN(I), 1)
and c(I) /∈ pi(NN(Adv(I)), 1)).
The goal of adversarial attacks is to design this function Adv that succeeds in fooling the network for a
large set of images. Ideally, we would like to achieve this misclassification3 by adding only some small
perturbation (under some metric) to the image. The presence of adversarial images shows that there exist
small perturbations in input that produce large perturbations at the output of the last layer.
Adversarial threat models can be divided into two broad classes.4 The first class of models roughly assumes
that the adversary has a total knowledge of the network architecture and the parameters resulting from
training (or access to the labeled training set). The second class of threat models, as considered in this paper,
make no assumptions about the adversary having access to the network architecture, network parameters,
or the training set. In this case, the adversary has only a black-box (oracle) access to the network, in that
it can query the network NN on an image I and observe the output NN(I). In our experimental section
(Section 6), we also consider a slight weakening of this black-box model where the adversary has only the
ability to use a proxy of the network NN as an oracle.
3Note that the misclassification is at test time, once the trained network has been deployed.
4More fine-grained classification has also been considered in (Papernot et al., 2016c) where adversaries are categorized by the
information and capabilities at their disposal.
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A black-box threat model in the context of deep neural networks was first considered by Papernot et al.
(2016b). There is however one subtle difference between the threat model considered here and that considered
by Papernot et al. (2016b) in what the adversary can access as an output. While the adversary presented in
(Papernot et al., 2016b) requires access to the class label assigned by the network which is the same level
of access needed by our simple randomized adversary (presented in Section 4), our local-search adversary
(presented in Section 5) requires access to oc(I) (the probability assigned to the true label c(I) by the network
on input I) and the pi vector (for checking whether k-misclassification has been achieved). Our adversarial
approaches does not require access to the complete probability vector (NN(I)). Also as pointed out earlier,
compared to (Papernot et al., 2016b), our approach is more direct (needs no transferability assumption),
requires no retraining, and can be adapted to achieve k-misclassification rather than just 1-misclassification.
4 Black-box Generation: A First Attempt
In this section, we present a simple black-box adversary that operates by perturbing a single pixel (or a small
set of pixels) selected at random. In the next section, we build upon this idea to construct an adversary that
achieves better success by making adaptive choices.
Power of One Pixel. Starting point of our investigation is to understand the influence of a single pixel
in an adversarial setting. Most existing adversarial attacks operate by applying the same perturbation on
each individual pixel while minimizing the overall perturbation (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), while recent research have yielded attacks that perturb only a fraction of
the pixels (Papernot et al., 2016c,b; Grosse et al., 2016). However, in all these cases, no explicit restriction
is placed on the number of pixels that can be perturbed. Therefore, it is natural to ask: whether it is
possible to force the network to misclassify an image by modifying a single pixel? If so, how strong should
this perturbation be? We run several experiments to shed light on these questions. For simplicity, in this
section, we focus the case of 1-misclassification, even though all discussions easily extend to the case of
k-misclassification for k > 1. We begin with a useful definition.
Definition 3 (Critical Pixel) 5 Given a trained neural network NN and an image I, a pixel (?, x, y) in I
is a critical pixel if a perturbation of this pixel generates an image that is misclassified by the network NN.
In other words, (?, x, y) is a critical pixel in I if there exists another neighboring image Ip which differs from
I only in values at the pixel location (x, y) such that c(I) /∈ pi(NN(Ip), 1).
The image Ip can be generated in multiple ways, here we consider a class of sign-preserving perturbation
functions defined as follows. Let Pert(I, p, x, y) be a function that takes as input an image I, a perturbation
parameter p ∈ R, and a location (x, y), and outputs an image I(x,y)p ∈ R`×w×h, defined as:
I(x,y)p (b, u, v)
defn
=
{
(I(b, u, v) if x 6= u or y 6= v
p× sign(I(b, u, v)) otherwise (1)
In other words, the image I(x,y)p = Pert(I, p, x, y) has same values as image I at all pixels except the pixel
(?, x, y). The value of the image I(x,y)p at pixel (?, x, y) is just p× sign(I(?, x, y)). Note that unlike some of
the previous adversarial attacks (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016;
Papernot et al., 2016c; Grosse et al., 2016), our threat model does not assume access to the true network
gradient factors, hence the construction of the perturbed image has to be oblivious to the network parameters.
In the following, we say a pixel (?, x, y) in image I is critical iff c(I) /∈ pi(NN(I(x,y)p ), 1).
5In the definition of critical pixel we have not considered how well the original image I is classified by NN, i.e., whether
c(I) ∈ pi(NN(I), 1). In particular, if c(I) /∈ pi(NN(I), 1) then by definition all pixels in the image are critical even without any
perturbation. In our experiments, we ignore these images and only focus on images I where c(I) ∈ pi(NN(I), 1), which we refer
to as good images (Definition 4).
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Critical Pixels are Common. Our first experiment is to investigate existence of critical pixels in the
considered dataset of images. To do so, we perform a simple procedure that picks a location (x, y) in the image
I and applies the Pert function to this pixel to obtain a perturbed image I(x,y)p . Then the perturbed image
is run through the trained network, and we check whether it was misclassified or not. If the perturbed image
I
(x,y)
p is misclassified then we have identified a critical pixel. While we can exhaustively repeat this procedure
for all pixels in an image, for computational efficiency we instead perform it only on a fraction of randomly
chosen pixels, and our results somewhat surprisingly suggest that in many cases this is sufficient to generate an
adversarial image. Algorithm RandAdv presents the pseudo-code for this experiment. Algorithm RandAdv,
selects U random pixels (with replacement) and performs checks whether the pixel is critical or not. The
algorithm output is an unbiased estimate for the fraction of critical pixels in the input image I. Note that
the algorithm can fail in generating an adversarial image (i.e., in finding any critical pixel for an image). The
following definition will be useful for our ensuing discussion.
Definition 4 (Good Image) We say that an image I with true label c(I) is good for a network NN iff
c(I) ∈ pi(NN(I), 1) (i.e., NN predicts c(I) as the most likely label for I).
Our first observation is that sometimes even small perturbation to a pixel can be sufficient to obtain an
adversarial image. Table 2 shows two images and their adversarial counterparts, with p = 1. Often, original
and adversarial images are indistinguishable to the human eye, but sometimes the critical pixel is visible
(Table 2).
(a) original (b) perturbed (c) original (d) perturbed
Table 2: The row contains original images followed by misclassified images where only one pixel (pointed
using a black arrow) was perturbed with perturbation parameter p = 1. After perturbation, in the first case
(images (a) and (b)) an automobile gets misclassified as a truck, and in the second case (images (c) and (d))
a cat gets misclassified as a dog.
We also tried to understand the effect of larger perturbation parameter values. We set U to half the
number of pixels in each image. After usual training of the neural network using the training set (see
Section 6 for more details about training), we ran Algorithm RandAdv on 1000 randomly drawn images
from the test set of the corresponding dataset. In our experiments, we varied perturbation parameter in
the range {1, 5, 10, 100}. Before we consider our results, we note some of the perturbation values that we
use to construct the adversarial image might construct images that are not in the original image space.6
However, these results are still somewhat surprising, because even though we allow large (even out-of-range)
perturbation, it is applied to exactly one pixel in the image, and it appears that it suffices to even pick the
pixel at random.
Figures 1 and 2 show results for 4 datasets (more details about the datasets and the networks are presented
in Section 6). On the x-axis we show the perturbation parameter p. In Figure 1, the y-axis represents the
output of Algorithm RandAdv averaged over good images for the network.7 The first observation that
6We fix this shortcoming using a local-search based strategy in the next section.
7Note by focusing on good images, we make sure that we are only accounting for those cases where perturbation is needed for
creating an adversarial image.
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Figure 1: Output of Algorithm RandAdv (averaged over good images). The results are for two networks: a)
Network-in-Network and b) VGG. The perturbation parameter p is varied from {1, 5, 10, 100}.
we can make is that the critical pixels are common, and in fact, as p grows the fraction of critical pixels
increases. For example, in CIFAR10, with p = 100, almost 80% (on average) of the pixels randomly selected
are critical. In Figure 2, the y-axis represents the fraction of successful adversarial images generated by
Algorithm RandAdv, i.e., fraction of inputs where Algorithm RandAdv is successful in finding at least
one critical pixel. Again we notice that as p grows it gets easier for Algorithm RandAdv to construct an
adversarial image.
Algorithm 1 RandAdv (NN)
1: Input: Image I with true label c(I) ∈ {1, . . . , C}, perturbation factor p ∈ R, and a budget U ∈ N on the
number of trials
2: Output: A randomized estimate on the fraction of critical pixels in the input image I
3: i = 1, critical = 0
4: while i ≤ U do
5: randomly pick a pixel (?, x, y)
6: compute a perturbed image I(x,y)p = Pert(I, p, x, y)
7: if c(I) /∈ pi(NN(I(x,y)p ), 1) then
8: critical← critical + 1
9: end if
10: i← i+ 1
11: end while
12: {The algorithm succeeds in generating an adversarial image if it finds at least one critical pixel}
13: return criticalU
Another observation is that for the MNIST and STL10 datasets, Algorithm RandAdv succeeds in finding
fewer critical pixels as compared to SVHN and CIFAR10 datasets. We give the following explanation for this
observation. The majority of pixels in an MNIST image belong to the background, hence, these pixels are
less likely to be critical. On the other hand, STL10 contains high resolution images, 96× 96, where perhaps a
single pixel has less of an impact on the output prediction. The latter observation motivated us to generalize
the notion of a critical pixel to a critical set.
Definition 5 (Critical Set) Given a trained neural network NN and an image I, a critical set of I is a set
of pixels
⋃
(x,y){(?, x, y)} in I such that a perturbation of these pixels generates an image that is misclassified
by the network NN.
The general goal will be to find critical sets of small size in an image. With this notion of critical set, we
considered constructing adversarial images on the high-resolution ImageNet1000 dataset. We can modify
the definition of I(x,y)p (from (1)) where instead of a single pixel we perturb all the pixels in a set. Similarly,
we can devise a simple extension to Algorithm RandAdv to operate with a set of pixels and to output an
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Figure 2: Fraction of images where Algorithm RandAdv succeeds in finding at least one critical pixel. Again we
only start with only good images.
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Figure 3: Experiments in Figures 1 and 2 for the high-resolution ImageNet1000 dataset. The results are again for
good images from a set of 1000 randomly selected images. We use a slightly modified version of Algorithm RandAdv
that perturbs a set of 50 pixels.
unbiased estimate for the fraction of critical sets of some fixed size (50 in our case) in the input image.8 Note
that a set size of 50 pixels is still a tiny fraction of all the pixels in a standard (center) crop of size 224× 224,
namely just 0.09%. We use a larger perturbation parameter p than before, and set (U) the budget on the
number of trials on an image as 5000. Figure 3 shows our results. Overall, we note that we can draw similar
conclusions as before, i.e., increasing the perturbation parameter creates more critical sets making them
easier to find and relatively small perturbations are sufficient to construct adversarial images.
5 Black-box Generation: A Greedy Approach
The results from Section 4 show that most images have critical pixels such that modifying these pixels
significantly leads to a failure of NN to classify the image correctly. However, one shortcoming of Algo-
rithm RandAdv was that to build adversarial images, we sometimes had to apply a large perturbation to a
single pixel (or a small set of pixels). Hence, there might exist a pixel (or a set of pixels) in the adversarial
image whose coordinate value could lie outside the valid range [LB,UB]. To overcome this issue, we need to
redesign the search procedure to generate adversarial images that still belong to the original image space I
(defined in Section 3). Here a brute-force approach is generally not feasible because of computational reasons,
especially in high-resolution images. Hence, we need to develop an efficient heuristic procedure to find the
right small set of pixels to be perturbed. Our solution presented in this section is based on performing a
greedy local search over the image space.
8Searching over all pixel sets of size 50 pixels is computationally prohibitive, which again motivates the need for a randomized
strategy as proposed in Algorithm RandAdv.
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We consider the general k-misclassification problem (Definition 1) where an adversarial attack ensures that
the true label does not appear in the top-k predictions of the network. We utilize a local-search procedure,
which is an incomplete search procedure that is widely used for solving combinatorial problems appearing in
diverse domains such as graph clustering, scheduling, logistics, and verification (Lenstra, 1997). For a general
optimization problem it works as follows. Consider an objective function f(z) : Rn → R where the goal is
to minimize f(z). The local-search procedure works in rounds, where each round consists of two steps. Let
zi−1 be the solution iterate after round i− 1. Consider round i. The first step is to select a small subset of
points Z = {zˆ1, . . . , zˆn}, a so called local neighborhood, and evaluate f(zˆj) for every zˆj ∈ Z. Usually, the
set Z consist of points that are close to current zi−1 for some measure of distance which is domain specific.
The second step selects a new solution zi taking into account the previous solution zi−1 and the points in Z.
Hence, zi = g(f(zi−1), f(zˆ1), . . . , f(zˆn)), where g is some pre-defined transformation function.
We adapt this general procedure to search critical sets efficiently as explained below. Our optimization
problem will try to minimize the probability that the network determines an perturbed image has the class
label of the original image, and by using a local-search procedure we generate perturbed images which differ
from the original image in only few pixels. Intuitively, in each round, our local-search procedure computes an
implicit approximation to the gradient of the current image by understanding the influence of a few pixels on
the output, which is then used to update the current image.
(a) First, we need to define the cost function f . Let I be the image (with true label c(I)) whose adversarial
image we want to generate for a target neural network NN. For some input image Iˆ, we use the objective
function fc(I)(Iˆ) which equals the probability assigned by the network NN that the input image Iˆ belongs
to class c(I). More formally,
fc(I)(Iˆ) = oc(I) where NN(Iˆ) = (o1, . . . , oC),
with oj denoting the probability as determined by NN that image Iˆ belongs to class j. Our local-search
procedure aims to minimize this function.
(b) Second, we consider how to form a neighborhood set of images. As mentioned above, the local-search
procedure operates in rounds. Let Iˆi−1 be the image after round i− 1. Our neighborhood will consist of
images that are different in one pixel from the image Iˆi−1. In other words, if we measure the distance
between Iˆi−1 and any image in the neighborhood as the number of perturbed pixels, then this distance
is the same (equal to one) for all of them. Therefore, we can define the neighborhood in terms of a set
of pixel locations. Let (PX , PY )i be a set of pixel locations. For the first round (PX , PY )0 is randomly
generated. At each subsequent round, it is formed based on a set of pixel locations which were perturbed in
the previous round. Let (P ∗X , P
∗
Y )i−1 denote the pixel locations that were perturbed in round i−1 (formally
defined below). Then
(PX , PY )i =
⋃
{(a,b)∈(P∗X ,P∗Y )i−1}
⋃
{x∈[a−d,a+d],y∈[b−d,b+d]}
(x, y),
where d is a parameter. In other words, we consider pixels that were perturbed in the previous round, and
for each such pixel we consider all pixels in a small square with the side length 2d centered at that pixel.
This defines the neighborhood considered in round i.
(c) Third, we describe the transformation function g of a set of pixel locations. The function g takes as input
an image Iˆ, a set of pixel locations (PX , PY ), a parameter t that defines how many pixels will be perturbed
by g, and two perturbation parameters p and r. In round i of the local-search procedure, the function
g(Iˆi−1, (PX , PY )i−1, t, p, r) outputs a new image, such that exactly t pixels of Iˆi−1 are perturbed, and an
auxiliary set of pixel locations (P ∗X , P
∗
Y )i to record which t pixels where perturbed at this round, so we
have (Iˆi, (P ∗X , P
∗
Y )i) = g(Iˆi−1, (PX , PY )i−1, t, p, r). Next we describe transformations that g performs in
round i. As the first step, g constructs a set of perturbed images based on (PX , PY )i−1:
I =
⋃
(x,y)∈(PX ,PY )i−1
{Pert(Iˆi−1, p, (x, y))},
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where Pert is the perturbation function defined through (1). Then it computes the score of each image in
I as
∀I˜ ∈ I : score(I˜) = fc(I)(I˜),
and it sorts (in decreasing order) images in I based on the above score function to construct sorted(I).
Pixels whose perturbation lead to a larger decrease of f are more likely useful in constructing an adversarial
candidate. From sorted(I), it records a set of pixel locations (P ∗X , P ∗Y )i based on the first t elements of
sorted(I), where the parameter t regulates the number of pixels perturbed in each round. Formally,
(P ∗X , P
∗
Y )i = {(x, y) : Pert(Iˆi−1, p, (x, y)) ∈ sorted(I)[1 : t]},
where sorted(I)[1 : t] represents the first t sorted images in sorted(I). Finally, Iˆi is constructed from Iˆi−1
by perturbing each pixel in location (x, y) ∈ (P ∗X , P ∗Y )i with a perturbation value r. The perturbation is
performed in a cyclic way (as explained in Algorithm Cyclic) so that we make sure that all coordinate
values in Iˆi are within the valid bounds of LB and UB. Note that at the end of every round i, Iˆi is a valid
image from the image space I.
We want to point out that the function g uses two perturbation parameters, p and r. The value of r
is kept small in the range [0, 2]. On the other hand, we do not put any explicit restrictions on the value
of p. The best choice of p will be one that facilitates the identification of the “best” pixels to perturb in
each round. In our experiments, we adjust the value of p automatically during the search. We defer this
discussion to the experimental section.
Algorithm LocSearchAdv shows the complete pseudocode of our local-search procedure. At the high
level, the algorithm takes an image as input, and in each round, finds some pixel locations to perturb using the
above defined objective function and then applies the above defined transformation function to these selected
pixels to construct a new (perturbed) image. It terminates if it succeeds to push the true label below the kth
place in the confidence score vector at any round. Otherwise, it proceeds to the next round (for a maximum
of R rounds). Note that the number of pixels in an image perturbed by Algorithm LocSearchAdv is at
most t × R and in practice (see Tables 4, 5,and 6 in Section 6) it is much less. In round i, we query the
network at most the number of times as the number of pixels in (PX , PY )i which after the first round is at
most 2d× 2d× t (again in practice this is much less because of the overlaps in the neighborhood squares).
Algorithm 2 Cyclic (r, b, x, y)
Assumptions: Perturbation parameter r ∈ [0, 2] and LB ≤ 0 ≤ UB
Output: Perturbed image value at the coordinate (b, x, y) which lies in the range [LB,UB]
if rI(b, x, y) < LB then
return rI(b, x, y) + (UB− LB)
else if rI(b, x, y) > UB then
return rI(b, x, y)− (UB− LB)
else
return rI(b, x, y)
end if
In Section 6, we demonstrate the efficacy of Algorithm LocSearchAdv in constructing adversarial images.
We first highlight an interesting connection between the pixels perturbed and their influences measured by a
notion of called saliency map.
A Relation to Saliency Maps. Simonyan et al. (2014) introduced the notion of saliency map as a way
to rank pixels of the original images w.r.t. their influence on the output of the network. The intuition is
that influential pixels in the saliency map are more likely to be important pixels that represent objects
and, for example, can be used for weakly supervised object localization. Formally, let NNc(I)(I) denote
the probability assigned to true class c(I) by the network NN on input I ∈ R`×w×h. Let Wc(I) ∈ R`×w×h
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Algorithm 3 LocSearchAdv (NN)
Input: Image I with true label c(I) ∈ {1, . . . , C}, two perturbation parameters p ∈ R and r ∈ [0, 2],
and four other parameters: the half side length of the neighborhood square d ∈ N, the number of pixels
perturbed at each round t ∈ N, the threshold k ∈ N for k-misclassification, and an upper bound on the
number of rounds R ∈ N.
Output: Success/Failure depending on whether the algorithm finds an adversarial image or not
Iˆ0 = I, i = 1
Pick 10% of pixel locations from I at random to form (PX , PY )0
while i ≤ R do
{Computing the function g using the neighborhood}
I ← ⋃(x,y)∈(PX ,PY )i−1{Pert(Iˆi−1, p, x, y)}
Compute score(I˜) = fc(I)(I˜) for each I˜ ∈ I (where fc(I)(I˜) = oc(I) with NN(I˜) = (o1, . . . , oC))
sorted(I)← images in I sorted by descending order of score
(P ∗X , P
∗
Y )i ← {(x, y) : Pert(Iˆi−1, p, x, y) ∈ sorted(I)[1 : t]} (with ties broken arbitrarily)
{Generation of the perturbed image Iˆi}
for (x, y) ∈ (P ∗X , P ∗Y )i and each channel b do
Iˆi(b, x, y)← Cyclic (r, b, x, y)
end for
{Check whether the perturbed image Iˆi is an adversarial image}
if c(I) /∈ pi(NN(Iˆi), k) then
return Success
end if
{Update a neighborhood of pixel locations for the next round}
(PX , PY )i ←
⋃
{(a,b)∈(P∗X ,P∗Y )i−1}
⋃
{x∈[a−d,a+d],y∈[b−d,b+d]}(x, y)
i← i+ 1
end while
return Failure
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Table 3: Results on ImageNet1000 using VGG CNN-S (Caffe) network (Chatfield et al., 2014a). Columns
from left to right: the original image, top 150 pixels chosen according to their saliency scores (in white), the
absolute difference between the perturbed image and the true image (the pixels that are perturbed appear in
white), and the perturbed image. Adversarial misclassification (rows from top to bottom): a ruffed grouse
misclassified as a frilled lizard, an artichoke misclassified as a sleeping bag, a bubble misclassified as a fountain,
and a hare misclassified as a cheetah.
denote the derivative of NNc(I) with respect to the input evaluated at image I. The saliency map of I is
the matrix M ∈ Rw×h such that Mi,j = maxb∈[`] |Wc(I)(b, x, y)|, where Wc(I)(b, x, y) is the element of Wc(I)
corresponding to channel b and location (x, y). Pixels with higher scores are considered more influential. In
subsequent works, this notion has been extended to adversarial saliency maps that can be useful in generating
adversarial perturbations (Papernot et al., 2016c).
Computing the exact saliency scores for an image requires complete access to the network NN, which
we do not assume. However, a natural hypothesis is that the pixels selected by Algorithm LocSearchAdv
for perturbation are related to pixels with large saliency scores. We use the ImageNet1000 dataset to test
this hypothesis. In Figure 3, we present some qualitative results. As can be seen from the pictures, the
pixels perturbed by Algorithm LocSearchAdv appear correlated with pixels with high saliency scores.
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Quantitatively, we observed that the pixels that occupy top-10% of the saliency map, on average contain
more than 23% of the pixels chosen by Algorithm LocSearchAdv for perturbation (and this overlap only
grows when we consider a bigger chunk of pixels picked by their saliency scores). Note that this is correlation
is not though a random occurrence. For an image I, let SI denote the set of pixels in I that rank among the
top-10% in the saliency map. If we pick a random set of around 200 pixels (this is on average number of pixels
perturbed per image by Algorithm LocSearchAdv perturbs, see Table 5), we expect only about 10% to
them to intersect with SI and standard tail bounds show that the probability that at least 23% of the pixels of
this random set intersects with SI is extremely small.9 Therefore, it appears that Algorithm LocSearchAdv
rediscovers part of the high salient score pixels but without explicitly computing the gradients.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We start by describing our experimental setup. We used Caffe and Torch machine learning frameworks to
train the networks. All algorithms to generate adversarial images were implemented in Lua within Torch 7.
All experiments were performed on a cluster of GPUs using a single GPU for each run.
Datasets. We use 5 popular datasets: MNIST (handwritten digits recognition dataset), CIFAR10 (ob-
jects recognition dataset), SVHN (digits recognition dataset), STL10 (objects recognition dataset), and
ImageNet1000 (objects recognition dataset).
Models. We trained Network-in-Network (Lin et al., 2014) and VGG (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014) for
MNIST, CIFAR, SVHN, STL10, with minor adjustments for the corresponding image sizes. Network-in-
Network is a building block of the commonly used GoogLeNet architecture that has demonstrated very good
performance on medium size datasets, e.g. CIFAR10 (Zagoruyko, 2015). VGG is another powerful network
that proved to be useful in many applications beyond image classification, like object localization (Ren et al.,
2015). We trained each model in two variants: with and without batch normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy, 2015).
Batch normalization was placed before a ReLU layer in all networks. For the ImageNet1000 dataset, we used
pre-trained VGG models from (Chatfield et al., 2014b) (we did not train them from scratch due to limited
resources). All Caffe VGG models were converted to Torch models using the loadcaffe package (Zagoruyko,
2016a). These models use different normalization procedures which we reproduced for each model based on
provided descriptions. Tables 4 and 5 (the second column ErrTop-1) show the top-1 (base) error for all
datasets and models that we considered. The results are comparable with the known state-of-the-art results
on these datasets (Benenson, 2016).
Related Techniques. There are quite a few approaches for generating adversarial images (as discussed
in Section 2). Most of these approaches require access to the network architecture and its parameter
values (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016c).10
The general idea behind these attacks is based on the evaluating the network’s sensitivity to the input
components in order to determine a perturbation that achieves the adversarial misclassification goal. Among
these approaches, the attack approach (known as the “fast-gradient sign method”) suggested by Goodfellow
et al. (2015) stands out for being able to efficiently generate adversarial images. Here we compare the
performance of our local-search based attack against this fast-gradient sign method.11
For completeness, we now briefly explain the fast-gradient sign method of Goodfellow et al. (2015). Given
an image I0, a label a ∈ {1, . . . , C}, and a network NN, the fast-gradient sign method perturbs I0 using the
9We can also use here a standard hypothesis testing for a proportion. The null-hypothesis is that the probability of intersection
equals 0.1 as with random Bernoulli trails, and test statistic Z = (0.23− 0.1)/√(0.1)(1− 0.1)/200 = 6.12 indicates that the
null-hypothesis can be rejected at significance level 0.01.
10Therefore, not entirely suited for a direct comparison with our black-box approach.
11Another reason for picking this approach for comparison is that it is also heavily utilized in the recent black-box attack
suggested by Papernot et al. (2016b), where they require additional transferability assumptions which is not required by our
attack.
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following update rule: Ipert0 = I0 +  · sign(∇I=I0 Loss(NN(I), a)) where sign(∇I=I0 Loss(NN(I), a)) is the
sign of the network’s cost function gradient (here Loss(NN(I), a) denotes the loss function of the network
NN given input I and class a). We vary a over all possible labels in the dataset and choose the best result
where this procedure is successful in generating an adversarial image. Without general guidelines for setting
, we experimented with several values of  starting from 0.07 and increasing this number. We found that
the value  = 0.212 was the smallest value where the fast-gradient sign method started to yield competitive
performance compared to our algorithm. Smaller values of  leads to generation of fewer adversarial images,
e.g., at  = 0.1, the percentage of generated adversarial images is reduced by around 10% as compared to
the value at  = 0.2 for the CIFAR10 dataset on the Network-in-Network model. Larger values of  tends to
generate more adversarial images, but this comes at the cost of an increase in the perturbation. As we discuss
later, our local-search based approach yields better results than the fast-gradient sign method in both the
volume of adversarial images generated and the amount of perturbation applied. Another important point to
remember is that unlike the fast-gradient sign method, our approach is based on a weaker and more realistic
assumption on the adversarial power, making our attacks more widely applicable.
Implementing Algorithm LocSearchAdv. For each image I, we ran Algorithm LocSearchAdv
for at most 150 rounds, perturbing 5 pixels at each round, and use squares of side length 10 to form the
neighborhood (i.e., R = 150, t = 5, d = 5). With this setting of parameters, we perturb a maximum of
t×R = 750 pixels in an image. The perturbation parameter p was adaptively adjusted during the search.
This helps in faster determination of the most helpful pixels in generating the adversarial image. Let I be
the original image. For some round i of the algorithm, define o¯c(I) = avg(x,y){oc(I) : (x, y) ∈ (P ∗X , P ∗Y )i−1},
where oc(I) is the probability assigned to class label c(I) in NN(Pert(Iˆi−1, p, x, y)) (here o¯c(I) provides an
approximation of the average confidence of the network NN in predicting the true label over perturbed
images). At each round, we increase the value of p if o¯c(I) is close to one and decrease p if o¯c(I) is low, e.g.,
below 0.3. For Algorithm Cyclic, we set r = 3/2. To avoid perturbing the most sensitive pixels frequently,
we make sure that if a pixel is perturbed in a round then we exclude it from consideration for the next 30
rounds.
Experimental Observations. For ease of comparison with the fast-gradient sign method (Goodfellow
et al., 2015), we set k = 1 and focus on achieving 1-misclassification. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of our
experiments on the test sets. The first column shows the dataset name. The second column (ErrTop-1)
presents the top-1 misclassification rate on the corresponding test dataset without any perturbation (base error).
ErrTop-1(Adv) is the top-1 misclassification rate where each original image in the test set was replaced
with an generated perturbed image (using either our approach or the fast-gradient sign method (Goodfellow
et al., 2015) which is denoted as FGSM).13
In the following, we say an adversarial generation technique Adv, given an input image I, succeeds in
generating an adversarial imageAdv(I) for a networkNN iff c(I) ∈ pi(NN(I), 1) and c(I) /∈ pi(NN(Adv(I)), 1).
The conf column shows the average confidence over all successful adversarial images for the corresponding
technique. The ptb column shows the average (absolute) perturbation added per coordinate in cases of
successful adversarial generation. More formally, let T denote the test set and TAdv ⊆ T denote the set of
images in T on which Adv is successful. Then,
ptb =
1
|TAdv|
∑
I∈TAdv
1
`× w × h
∑
b,x,y
|I(b, x, y)−Adv(I)(b, x, y)|,
where I ∈ R`×w×h is the original image and Adv(I) ∈ R`×w×h is the corresponding adversarial image. Note
that the inner summation is measuring the L1-distance between I and Adv(I). The ptbpixels column
12For the ImageNet1000 dataset, we set  differently as discussed later.
13Note that by explicitly constraining the number of pixels that can be perturbed, as we do in our approach, it might be
impossible to get to a 100% misclassification rate on some datasets. Similarly, the fast-gradient sign method fails to achieve a
100% misclassification rate even with larger values of  (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
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shows the average percentage of perturbed pixels in the successful adversarial images. Similarly, time column
shows the average time (in seconds) to generate a successful adversarial image. Finally, the last column
indicates the type of network architecture.
As is quite evident from these results, Algorithm LocSearchAdv is more effective than the fast-gradient
sign method in generating adversarial images, even without having access to the network architecture and its
parameter values. The difference is quite prominent for networks trained with batch normalization as here we
noticed that the fast-gradient sign method has difficulties producing adversarial images.14 Another advantage
with our approach is that it modifies a very tiny fraction of pixels as compared to all the pixels perturbed
by the fast-gradient sign method, and also in many cases with far less average perturbation. Putting these
points together demonstrates that Algorithm LocSearchAdv is successful in generating more adversarial
images than the fast-gradient sign method, while modifying far fewer pixels and adding less noise per image.
On the other side, the fast-gradient sign method takes lesser time in the generation process and generally
seems to produce higher confidence scores for the adversarial (misclassified) images.
Table 5 shows the results for several variants of VGG network trained on the ImageNet1000 dataset.
These networks do not have batch normalization layers (Chatfield et al., 2014b; Zagoruyko, 2016a). We set
 = 1 for the fast-gradient sign method as a different pre-processing technique was used for this network (we
converted these networks from pre-trained Caffe models). Results are similar to that observed on the smaller
datasets. In most cases, our proposed local-search based approach is more successful in generating adversarial
images while on average perturbing less than 0.55% of the pixels.
Case of Larger k’s. We now consider achieving k-misclassification for k ≥ 1 using Algorithm Loc-
SearchAdv. In Table 6, we present the results as we change the goal from 1-misclassification to 4-
misclassification on the CIFAR10 dataset. We use the same parameters as before for Algorithm Loc-
SearchAdv. As one would expect, as we increase the value of k, the effectiveness of the attack decreases,
perturbation and time needed increases. But overall our local-search procedure is still able to generate a
large fraction of adversarial images at even k = 4 with a small perturbation and computation time, meaning
that these images will fool even a system that is evaluated on a top-4 classification criteria. We are not
aware of a straightforward extension of the fast-gradient sign method (Goodfellow et al., 2015) to achieve
k-misclassification.
Even Weaker Adversarial Models. We also consider a weaker model where the adversary does not even
have a black-box (oracle) access to the network (NN) of interest, and has to rely on a black-box access to
somewhat of a “similar” (proxy) network as NN. For example, the adversary might want to evade a spam
filter A, but might have to develop adversarial images by utilizing the output of a spam filter B, which might
share properties similar to A.
We trained several modifications of Network-in-Network model for the CIFAR10 dataset, varying the
initial value of the learning rate, the size of filters, and the number of layers in the network. We observed
that between 25% to 43% of adversarial images generated by Algorithm LocSearchAdv using the original
network were also adversarial for these modified networks (at k = 1). The transferability of adversarial images
that we observe here has also been observed with other attacks too (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Papernot et al., 2016b,a) and demonstrates the wider applicability of all these attacks.
7 Conclusion
We investigate the inherent vulnerabilities in modern CNNs to practical black-box adversarial attacks. We
present approaches that can efficiently locate a small set of pixels, without using any gradient information,
which when perturbed lead to misclassification by a deep neural network. Our extensive experimental results,
14In general, we observed that models trained with batch normalization are somewhat more resilient to adversarial perturbations
probably because of the regularization properties of batch normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy, 2015).
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Dataset ErrTop-1 ErrTop-1(Adv) conf ptb ptbpixels(%)
time
(in sec) Technique Network
NNs trained with batch normalization
CIFAR10 11.65 97.63 0.47 0.04 3.75 0.68 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNCIFAR10 70.69 0.55 0.20 100.00 0.01 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
CIFAR10 11.62 97.51 0.74 0.04 3.16 0.78 LocSearchAdv (Ours) VGGCIFAR10 11.62 – – – – FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
STL10 29.81 58.17 0.42 0.02 1.20 7.15 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNSTL10 54.85 0.53 0.20 100.00 0.03 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
STL10 26.50 65.76 0.47 0.02 1.11 13.90 LocSearchAdv (Ours) VGGSTL10 26.50 – – – – FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
SVHN 9.71 97.06 0.47 0.05 4.51 1.02 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNSVHN 48.62 0.49 0.20 100.00 0.02 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
SVHN 4.77 81.10 0.66 0.07 5.43 2.15 LocSearchAdv (Ours) VGGSVHN 4.77 – – – – FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
MNIST 0.33 91.42 0.54 0.20 2.24 0.64 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNMNIST 1.65 0.58 0.20 100.00 0.02 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
MNIST 0.44 93.48 0.63 0.21 2.20 0.64 LocSearchAdv (Ours) VGGMNIST 0.44 – – – – FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
NNs trained without batch normalization
CIFAR10 16.54 97.89 0.72 0.04 3.24 0.58 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNCIFAR10 93.67 0.93 0.20 100.00 0.02 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
CIFAR10 19.79 97.98 0.77 0.04 2.99 0.72 LocSearchAdv (Ours) VGGCIFAR10 90.93 0.90 0.20 100.00 0.04 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
STL10 35.47 52.65 0.56 0.02 1.17 6.42 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNSTL10 87.16 0.94 0.20 100.00 0.04 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
STL10 43.91 59.38 0.52 0.01 1.09 19.65 LocSearchAdv (Ours) VGGSTL10 91.36 0.93 0.20 100.00 0.10 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
SVHN 6.15 92.31 0.68 0.05 4.34 1.06 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNSVHN 73.97 0.84 0.20 100.00 0.01 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) NinN
SVHN 7.31 88.34 0.68 0.05 4.09 1.00 LocSearchAdv (Ours) NinNSVHN 76.78 0.89 0.20 100.00 0.04 FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) VGG
Table 4: Results for four datasets: CIFAR10, STL10, SVHN, and MNIST. The entries denote by denoted by “–
” are the cases where the fast-gradient sign method fails to produce any adversarial image in our experimental
setup.
somewhat surprisingly, demonstrates the effectiveness of our simple approaches in generating adversarial
examples.
Defenses against these attacks is an interesting research direction. However, we note that here that by
limiting the perturbation to some pixels (being localized) the adversarial images generated by our local-search
based approach do not represent the distribution of the original data. This means for these adversarial
images, the use of adversarial training (or fine-tuning), a technique of training (or fine-tuning) networks
on adversarial images to build more robust classifiers, is not very effective. In fact, even with adversarial
training we noticed that the networks ability to resist new local-search based adversarial attack improves only
marginally (on average between 1-2%). On the other hand, we suspect that one possible counter-measure to
these localized adversarial attacks could be based on performing a careful analysis of the oracle queries to
thwart the attempts to generate an adversarial image.
Finally, we believe that our local-search approach can also be used for attacks against other machine
learning systems and can serve as an useful tool in measuring the robustness of these systems.
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